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TRADE AND TRADEOFFS: THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL
PATENT EXHAUSTION
Daniel J. Hemel* & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette**
Sellers of patented products ranging from printer cartridges to
pharmaceuticals frequently charge higher prices in the United States
than they do abroad. To maintain this price diﬀerential, such sellers
often prohibit the resale of their goods in the United States. The Federal
Circuit has maintained that importers may be sued for infringing U.S.
patents on these goods. But that may change: In Lexmark v. Impression
Products, the en banc Federal Circuit was asked to hold that the sale of a
patented product anywhere in the world “exhausts” the seller’s U.S.
patent rights. 1 In a February 2016 decision, the Federal Circuit chose to
maintain the status quo, over a dissent from Judge Timothy B. Dyk. 2
Patent law commentators think it is likely that the Supreme Court will
hear the case. 3 If the Supreme Court adopts a rule of international
patent exhaustion, ﬁrms that sell patented products abroad will ﬁnd it
much harder to prevent those products from being resold in the United
States.
Both advocates and opponents of international patent exhaustion
argue that their preferred rule would be more eﬃcient (i.e., would
increase aggregate welfare). This Essay suggests, however, that whether
international patent exhaustion increases aggregate welfare depends on
whose welfare is aggregated. Put diﬀerently, the desirability of international patent exhaustion depends on a question that economic models
*. Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
**. Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School. For helpful comments, we thank Paul
Goldstein, Mark Lemley, Jonathan Masur, Doug Melamed, and Al Sykes.
1. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 785 F.3d 565 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(calling for en banc brieﬁng). The court issued its opinion on February 12, 2016.
2. Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Impression Prods. Inc., Nos. 2014-1617, 2014-1619, 2016 WL
559042 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016), petition for cert. ﬁled. The opinion was released shortly
before this Essay went to press, and it cited a draft of this piece that is available on SSRN.
Id. at *45 n.26. The substance of this Essay remains unchanged.
3. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Breaking News: U.S. Federal Circuit Adheres to
National Exhaustion of Patent Rights, Comparative Patent Remedies (Feb. 12, 2016, 8:26
AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2016/02/breaking-news-us-federalcircuit.html [http://perma.cc/SB3Q-E6C8] (“Next stop, I feel reasonably certain, will be the
Supreme Court . . . .”); Scott W. Doyle et al., Lexmark Is Much Ado About Nothing—For
Now, Law360 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/760145/lexmark-is-muchado-about-nothing-for-now [http://perma.cc/NNT3-TXW5] (“The Federal Circuit’s
decision . . . foreshadows the potential for a future showdown in the Supreme Court and,
perhaps, another retooling of well-established Federal Circuit precedent by the Supreme
Court.”).
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alone cannot answer: How much weight (if any) should U.S. courts
assign to foreign interests when crafting patent policy?
This Essay explains why the adoption of a rule of international
patent exhaustion would likely lower prices of patented goods in the
United States and raise prices abroad. Moreover, such a rule would
impose costs on foreign governments that choose to subsidize access to
patented goods for their own citizens. These tradeoﬀs between U.S. and
foreign interests were ignored (or misunderstood) in the Lexmark
brieﬁng before the Federal Circuit. This Essay brings these tradeoﬀs into
clearer focus.
Part I provides an overview of the various positions taken in the
Lexmark brieﬁng before the Federal Circuit. Part II analyzes the likely
economic eﬀects of a U.S. international exhaustion rule. Part III explains
why a U.S. rule of international exhaustion would make it more diﬃcult
for foreign countries to use nonmarket mechanisms to allocate access to
patentable goods. Last, Part IV suggests several approaches that U.S.
courts can take when faced with tradeoﬀs between domestic and foreign
welfare.
I. WHY ECONOMIC POLICY MATTERS

FOR

EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

Both sides of the exhaustion debate agree on one fundamental point:
Economic considerations are and should be relevant to the resolution of
the exhaustion question in Lexmark. The judge-made patent-exhaustion
doctrine has not been codified. 4 Like many patent doctrines, it remains a
product of common law development, in which “economic analysis is a
broadly accepted interpretative gloss.” 5 The current rule of no inter4. When an exclusive right of importation was added to the Patent Act in 1994 to
comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), the Statement of Administrative Action said that TRIPS “does not aﬀect U.S. law
or practice relating to parallel importation of products protected by intellectual property
rights.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-316, at 312 (1994). Even if pre-1994 case law on international
patent exhaustion were clear, it would be diﬃcult to read this language as intending the
1994 amendments—which did not add any statutory language related to exhaustion—as
somehow codifying pre-1994 practice, as opposed to leaving exhaustion doctrine in the
continued care of the judiciary. But see John F. Duﬀy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain
and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2016) (arguing
international patent exhaustion is codiﬁed).
5. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duﬀy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 Yale L. J. 1590, 1619 (2011); see also id. at 1618–19 (analogizing Patent Act to
Sherman Act). Policy-oriented judicial development of patent doctrine is widely accepted.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can Solve It
103 (2009) (comparing Patent Act to antitrust law in its failure to specify how to apply its
principles in detail, and authorizing courts to play major role in deﬁning scope of
protection); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1119–20 (2003) (“There should be little
question that the patent statute, as currently structured, contemplates policy-oriented
judicial development of patent common law.”).
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national exhaustion stems from the Federal Circuit’s 2001 Jazz Photo
decision, 6 which now has the value of having been the prevailing rule for
nearly ﬁfteen years. But the Supreme Court is not bound by the Federal
Circuit’s precedent, and the Supreme Court recently held that authorized
foreign sales do exhaust U.S. copyrights, using logic that could (but need
not) be applied to patents. 7 Thus, statutory text and precedent do not
seem to significantly constrain the outcome in Lexmark.
At least three possible positions emerge from the briefs that were
ﬁled before the Federal Circuit in Lexmark. Impression Products and its
amici argued that an authorized sale anywhere in the world should always
exhaust the seller’s U.S. patent rights. 8 At the other end of the spectrum,
Lexmark and its amici argued that an authorized sale outside the United
States should not exhaust the seller’s U.S. patent rights unless the seller
explicitly relinquishes those rights. 9 This was the traditional Jazz Photo
rule, which the Federal Circuit majority reaﬃrmed in Lexmark. 10 The
United States staked out a middle ground in its amicus brief: It argued
that an authorized foreign sale should exhaust the seller’s U.S. patent
rights by default unless the seller explicitly reserves those rights. 11 This
6. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The Jazz Photo court did not seem to realize the importance of its decision on this issue.
The entire exhaustion analysis consists of the conclusory statement that “[t]o invoke the
protection of the ﬁrst sale doctrine, the authorized ﬁrst sale must have occurred under the
United States patent,” plus a mistaken citation to a single case. Id. at 1105 (citing Boesch v.
Graﬀ, 133 U.S. 697, 701–03 (1890)). The cited case did not involve an authorized ﬁrst
sale—it involved a German sale that was legal (due to prior user rights under German law)
but that the patentee did not authorize. Boesch, 133 U.S. at 701–03.
7. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013). The
copyright exhaustion issue in Kirtsaeng is easily distinguished from the patent exhaustion
issue in Lexmark: Patent exhaustion, unlike copyright ﬁrst sale, has not been codiﬁed;
patents, unlike copyrights, must be aﬃrmatively obtained in each jurisdiction and vary
dramatically in scope; and the Supreme Court’s concerns about “deeply embedded”
reliance of copyright users, id. at 1354, are not applicable here.
8. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Impression Products, Inc. on En Banc Review at 2-3, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2015),
2015 WL 3818682, at *4; see also infra note 15 and accompanying text (listing some of
Impression’s amici). None of these parties appears to dispute that patent owners can
contractually restrict manufacturers and distributors from importing patented products
into the United States. The patent owners would then be limited to contract remedies
(often in foreign courts) rather than patent remedies (including border measures), and
they could not enforce these contracts against third parties.
9. En Banc Brief for Plaintiﬀ-Cross Appellant Lexmark International, Inc. at 10,
Lexmark, No. 14-1617 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2015), 2015 WL 4995731, at *24; see also infra
note 13 and accompanying text (listing some of Lexmark’s amici).
10. Lexmark, 2016 WL 559042, at *2.
11. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed.
Cir. June 29, 2015), 2015 WL 4112927, at *13. This position is in some tension with the
United States’ position on the second issue in Lexmark, on which the United States argued
that “any post-sale restrictions that a patentee attempts to place on the use or resale of a
patented article cannot be enforced through patent law.” Id. at *1. This piece focuses only
on the international exhaustion issue.
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middle ground was advocated by Judge Dyk in his Lexmark dissent, which
was joined by Judge Hughes. 12
In this Essay we focus on the diﬀerences between Impression’s
mandatory-exhaustion position and the positions of the parties who
would allow sellers to reserve U.S. patent rights. To be sure, the gap
between Lexmark’s position (adopted by the Lexmark majority) and the
United States’ (adopted by the Lexmark dissent) is not insigniﬁcant: A
default rule of exhaustion might “nudge” patent owners to cede U.S.
rights even if they have the option to retain U.S. patent protection. A
mandatory exhaustion rule, however, would yield much more dramatic
distributive consequences than a shift to the United States’ exhaustionby-default position.
II. PATENT EXHAUSTION WINNERS

AND

LOSERS

An initial indication of who wins and who loses under a U.S. rule of
international patent exhaustion is apparent from the lineup of amici on
each side of the Lexmark dispute. Among private parties, those opposing
exhaustion generally proﬁt from sales of patented products and include
the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO), and a coalition of manufacturers of imaging
supplies (including Canon, Hewlett-Packard, Samsung, and Xerox). 13
The pro-exhaustion parties, who tend to depend on using others’ patents,
include many technology companies (such as Amazon, eBay, Dell,
Facebook, Google, Intel, and Samsung 14), Costco (which buys goods
abroad for U.S. resale), remanufacturing ﬁrms, and consumer groups
(including the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge). 15
12. Lexmark, 2016 WL 559042, at *55 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
13. Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization and CropLife International as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiﬀ-Cross-Appellant, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5076197; Brief of Imaging Supplies Coalition as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiﬀ/Cross-Appellant at 1, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18,
2015), 2015 WL 5076190, at *9 (listing members); Brief of Intellectual Property Owners
Association on Hearing En Banc as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiﬀ-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant Lexmark, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015), 2015 WL
5076192; Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiﬀ and Cross-Appellant Lexmark International, Inc., Lexmark,
No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5076195.
14. Bizarrely, Samsung is on two briefs supporting Impression and one supporting
Lexmark. See supra note 13, infra note 15 and accompanying text.
15. Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendant-Appellant Impression Products, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir.
June 19, 2015); Brief for Costco Wholesale Corporation and Retail Litigation Center, Inc.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. June
19, 2015); Brief of LG Electronics, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant,
Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 2015) [hereinafter Brief of LG Electronics]
(ﬁled for companies including Google, Intel, and Samsung); Brief of Public Knowledge et
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The academics who have signed on to amicus briefs have been mostly
aligned with the pro-exhaustion camp. 16
Pro-exhaustion parties argue that the current regime “fosters
enormous complication, uncertainty, and ineﬃciency” because ﬁrms that
seek to import goods into the United States must verify that no single
part is protected by a U.S. patent. 17 If patentees who sell products
overseas can reserve U.S. patent rights, then all those who want to
purchase a patented product abroad and bring it into the United States
will have to incur the information cost of determining whether the
patentee reserved U.S. rights—or else run the risk of a lawsuit. To be
sure, a patentee who reserves U.S. patent rights will internalize some of
the costs via the price mechanism (i.e., purchasers presumably will pay
less if the seller retains U.S. patent protection). But the patentee and the
ﬁrst foreign purchaser will not internalize all the third-party information
costs borne by the general class of consumers who wish to import
patented products to the United States. 18
Yet even under a rule of international exhaustion, downstream
purchasers who wish to import patented products into the United States
will face substantial information costs. Exhaustion only applies to “the
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Impression Products, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617
(Fed. Cir. June 19, 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Public Knowledge]; Corrected En Banc Brief
of Remanufacturing Associations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Lexmark, No.
2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2014), 2015 WL 4068148; see also Comput. & Commc’ns Indus.
Ass’n, Members, http://www.ccianet.org/about/members [http://perma.cc/P2ES-EP8B]
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (listing members including Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, and
Samsung).
16. There were two academic briefs favoring international exhaustion—one by
Professors Margreth Barrett and Fred Abbott and one by Stanford’s Intellectual Property
and Innovation Clinic on behalf of twenty-four IP professors and the American Antitrust
Institute. Corrected Brief of Professors Barrett and Abbott as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2015), 2015 WL 3645388; Brief of
Intellectual Property Professors and American Antitrust Institute as Amici Curiae in
Support of Defendant-Appellant, Lexmark, No. 2014-1617 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief of Intellectual Property Professors and American Antitrust Institute].
Professor Ted Field wrote a brief favoring the status quo. Amicus-Curiae Brief of Professor
Theodore L. Field in Support of Lexmark International, Inc., Lexmark, No. 2014-1617
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5076196.
17. Brief of LG Electronics, supra note 15, at 4–5.
18. This argument may sound strikingly similar to one made by Professors Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith in the context of real and personal property. Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 Yale L. J. 1, 26–34 (2000) (“The need for standardization in property law
stems from an externality involving measurement costs: Parties who create new property
rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they impose
on strangers to the title.”). Indeed, Merrill and Smith’s example of a Monday-only watch,
id. at 27, sounds much like the IP professors’ example of a patentee who “make[s] it a
condition of sale that a consumer use its patented widget only on Sundays,” Brief of
Intellectual Property Professors and American Antitrust Institute, supra note 16, at 28. For
a justiﬁcation of copyright exhaustion based on information costs, see generally Guy A.
Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 Emory L. J. 741 (2015).
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initial authorized sale of a patented item.” 19 So if a pharmaceutical ﬁrm
authorizes a Chinese manufacturer to sell a patented drug in China and
the manufacturer instead sells the drug in India, the unauthorized
Indian sale would not exhaust the pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s U.S. patent
rights. 20 Moreover, it is unclear what would happen if the patentee had
been granted no patent—or only a narrow patent—in the country of ﬁrst
sale. For instance, if a pharmaceutical ﬁrm authorizes a Chinese
manufacturer to sell a drug in China but the pharmaceutical ﬁrm only
has a U.S. patent (not a Chinese patent) on the drug, the ﬁrm might be
able to argue that the authorized sale in China did not exhaust U.S.
patent rights. To be sure, in the pharmaceutical context, even if they lose
the beneﬁt of exhaustion, U.S. manufacturers still have the protection of
a statute banning re-importation—albeit one subject to a number of
limitations that makes it less attractive to patentees than a no-exhaustion
rule. 21 And this protection is unavailable for nonpharmaceutical manufacturers. Furthermore, even if the foreign sale exhausts the seller’s U.S.
patents, the importer risks liability for infringing someone else’s U.S.
patents (e.g., even if Samsung authorized the foreign sale of one of its
Galaxy smartphones, Apple might still sue the importer). So while it is
true that allowing patentees to reserve U.S. patent rights does impose
some information-cost externalities on third parties, the cost of determining whether the patentee has reserved its U.S. patent rights does not
seem particularly onerous in comparison with all the other information
costs involved in verifying that a product is noninfringing.
Exhaustion opponents argue that international exhaustion would
limit the ability of patentees to engage in geographic price discrimination and that price discrimination in turn increases economic eﬃciency. A simple example helps to illustrate the point: Imagine a world
with three countries—one that is high income (say, the United States),
one that is middle income (say, Brazil), and one that is low income (say,
19. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (emphasis
added).
20. See id. at 636 (noting prior Supreme Court cases found no exhaustion where
licensee was not authorized to make particular kind of sale).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2012) (banning re-importation except where Secretary
authorizes such re-importation for “emergency medical care”). This statute is subject to a
personal use exemption, see id. § 384( j), and it depends on discretionary government
enforcement, which might not be particularly vigorous in cases where there is a large price
diﬀerential and U.S. policymakers are concerned about ballooning health care costs. This
statute also only prohibits re-importation, not importation of drugs manufactured abroad.
(It thus privileges U.S. manufacturers—though only to the extent that they are not competing with foreign manufacturers whose products can be imported for lower prices.)
Moreover, the re-importation ban only aﬀects prescription drugs; it does not aﬀect parallel
trade in other patented products that might be sold abroad at discounted prices, including other medical products such as medical devices. But to the extent that this statute
is able to replicate the eﬀects of a no-exhaustion rule for prescription drugs, it may produce a nice compromise for those who believe that prescription drugs should be treated
diﬀerently than other products.
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Ethiopia). Let us say that cardiac patients in the United States will pay up
to $10 for a certain patented pacemaker, that patients in Brazil will pay
up to $6, and that patients in Ethiopia will pay up to $2. For the sake of
simplicity, let us assume that there is one patient per country and that the
marginal cost of producing an additional pacemaker is zero. In a world
without international patent exhaustion, the patentee will charge $10 in
the United States, $6 in Brazil, and $2 in Ethiopia; its total revenue will
be $18, and deadweight loss will be zero. 22 In a world with international
patent exhaustion, however, the patentee cannot charge diﬀerent prices
in diﬀerent countries. This is because if the patentee tried, then
arbitrageurs would purchase the pacemaker in Ethiopia and resell it in
Brazil and the United States, causing prices across countries to converge.
The patentee will have to choose one worldwide price—and in this case,
the revenue-maximizing price would be $6. 23 The patentee would earn
$12 ($6 from the U.S. sale and $6 from the Brazilian sale), and the
deadweight loss due to the forgone Ethiopian transaction would be $2. 24
U.S. consumers would be better oﬀ (paying $6 instead of $10), Brazilian
consumers would be unaﬀected, and Ethiopian consumers would be
priced out of the market entirely.
This stylized example oversimpliﬁes the complicated economics of
geographic price discrimination, but its three basic conclusions remain
true in most models of parallel trade. First, a rule of international patent
exhaustion will push patentees to raise prices in low-income countries
and lower prices in high-income countries. 25 Second, a move to international exhaustion will reduce patentees’ proﬁts and thus reduce the
rewards from innovation, which may lead to a decline in aggregate investment in research and development. 26 Third, a rule of international
22. By “deadweight loss,” we mean the economic inefficiency that results from forgone
transactions when the price of a product exceeds its marginal cost.
23. The patentee earns $12 from setting a price of $6 (from the U.S. and Brazilian
sales), which is more than the $10 earned from a price of $10 (with only the U.S. sale) or
the $6 earned from a price of $2 (from making a sale in each of the three countries).
24. The full welfare loss would be even higher if the social value of treating a lowincome patient for heart disease exceeds the patient’s ability to pay.
25. This is not to say that prices will be exactly the same everywhere under an
exhaustion regime: For example, the U.S. price of a patented product may remain higher
than the price of the same product in Ethiopia if the diﬀerence is less than the cost of
transporting the product from Ethiopia to the United States. Export taxes in developing
nations also may allow some cross-country price diﬀerences to persist. See generally Daniel
Crosby, WTO Legal Status and Evolving Practice of Export Taxes, Bridges, Oct.–Nov. 2008,
at 3, http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/ﬁles/review/bridges/bridges12-5.pdf [http://
perma.cc/3JMB-DDA6] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (noting “general WTO rules do not
discipline Members’ application of export taxes” (emphasis omitted)). But even if it does
not lead to complete convergence, a regime of international patent exhaustion would
limit the ability of patentees to engage in geographic price discrimination.
26. If one believes that patentees reap excessive rewards under the current system,
then one might favor a rule of international patent exhaustion on the ground that it
reduces those rewards. For an explanation of the problems with allowing producers to
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patent exhaustion will interfere with geographic price discrimination
and in doing so, often will increase the deadweight loss from abovemarginal-cost pricing. 27 Concededly, one cannot say with certainty that a
rule of international patent exhaustion is less eﬃcient overall—the thirdparty information costs discussed above are one factor that may push in
the other direction. 28 What we can say with a high degree of conﬁdence
is that if the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit and adopts a
rule of mandatory exhaustion in the Lexmark case, prices of patented
products in the developing world will increase and prices of those same
products in the United States will fall. 29

capture all of the surplus they create, see generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257 (2007).
27. See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 Am. Econ. Rev.
870, 870–75 (1985) (identifying conditions under which imperfect price discrimination
enhances welfare).
28. Reviewing the diﬀerent theories, Keith Maskus concluded that “[t]here are no
simple answers,” but that based on existing empirical evidence, “it would be inadvisable to
move toward a global policy of . . . international exhaustion.” Keith E. Maskus, Parallel
Imports, 23 World Econ. 1269, 1270 (2000).
29. A rule of international patent exhaustion may have additional eﬀects on
economic eﬃciency—including some potentially positive eﬀects. For example, in a world
without exhaustion, countries can set price controls on patented products and as long as
the controlled price is above marginal cost, patentees cannot credibly threaten to withhold
their products from controlled markets. With international patent exhaustion, a patentee’s
threat to withhold its product from a price-controlled market becomes more credible: A
patentee will rationally refuse to sell its product at a controlled price if arbitrageurs can
purchase the product at that price and resell it in an uncontrolled market such as the
United States (thus undercutting the patentee’s U.S. price). See Gene M. Grossman &
Edwin L.-C. Lai, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, 39 RAND J. Econ. 378, 386–87
(2008) (explaining options available to patentee under regime with international
exhaustion). Signiﬁcantly, however, Grossman and Lai arrive at the same redistributive
result as our simple model: A rule of international patent exhaustion would lead to a
redistribution of wealth from consumers in the global South to the global North. See id. at
400 (concluding “legalization of parallel imports by North spells a welfare loss for South”
while “North fares better”). For another model with similar results, see Paul Pecorino,
Should the US Allow Prescription Drug Reimports from Canada?, 21 J. Health Econ. 699,
707 (2002) (concluding in a model with price controls, when reimportation is allowed,
“proﬁts of the domestic monopolist rise” and “prices rise abroad and fall at home”).
Additionally, the shape of the demand curve in rich and poor countries might
sometimes mean that a rule of international exhaustion increases global welfare. Imagine
that there are two countries—the United States and Mexico—and three consumers in
each country. The three U.S. consumers value a particular patented product at $10, $9,
and $5, respectively; the Mexican consumers value the product at $5, $3, and $1,
respectively. Again assume a marginal cost of zero. Without exhaustion, the patentee will
set the U.S. price at $9 and the Mexican price at $3. As a result, the producer surplus will
be $24, the consumer surplus will be $1 in the United States and $2 in Mexico, and the
social surplus will be $27. With exhaustion, the patentee will set the worldwide price at $5.
This results in a producer surplus of $20, consumer surpluses of $9 in the United States
and $0 in Mexico, and a social surplus of $29. Here too, however, the shift to a rule of
international exhaustion leads to a redistribution of wealth from foreign consumers to
U.S. consumers.
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The fact that mandatory exhaustion will beneﬁt U.S. consumers does
not mean that mandatory exhaustion will increase U.S. citizens’ welfare
overall. U.S. citizens are producers as well as consumers of patented
products, and—as noted above—mandatory exhaustion likely leads to
lower proﬁts for patentees. In the example above, the shift from a noexhaustion rule to mandatory exhaustion resulted in a $4 increase in
U.S. consumer surplus and a $6 decline in the patent holder’s proﬁts. If
the patent holder is American, then the net eﬀect of exhaustion on the
aggregate welfare of U.S. citizens is -$2. Note, though, that the majority
of U.S. patents are granted to foreign applicants 30 and when the patent
holder is a foreigner, the shift to exhaustion leads to a net increase in
U.S. citizens’ welfare. From a perspective of pure national interest (with
no regard for the interests of consumers or ﬁrms outside the United
States), the desirability of an exhaustion regime depends on whether the
gains to U.S. consumers outweigh the losses to U.S. patent holders—an
empirical question that no study has successfully answered.
It is not surprising, then, that U.S. ﬁrms with vast patent portfolios
have largely lined up on the anti-exhaustion side, while U.S. retailers
have adopted a pro-exhaustion position. What is surprising is that groups
focused on global access to medicines are advocating for a U.S. rule of
international exhaustion. For example, Public Citizen—which has identiﬁed global access to medicine as a top policy priority 31—nonetheless
joined a brief calling for a mandatory exhaustion rule. According to that
brief, “case studies ﬁnd that it is international exhaustion that reduces
prices and ameliorates the crisis of access to aﬀordable medicines.” 32 But
the cited case studies tell a somewhat diﬀerent story: They suggest that
some countries might benefit if they adopt a rule of international patent
exhaustion. For example, South Africa may have benefited from adopting
an exhaustion rule that allowed it to import lower-priced medicines from
countries such as India. 33 The studies say nothing about how U.S. exhaus30. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2014, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [http://perma.cc/
ZS53-ADFB] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
31. See Access to Medicines, Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/more-aboutaccess-to-medicine [http://perma.cc/V5UB-CS5Z] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (describing
Public Citizen’s Global Access to Medicines Program).
32. Brief of Public Knowledge, supra note 15, at 23. See also Burcu Kilic & Peter
Maybarduk, The Lexmark Litigation: Why Does Big Pharma Care So Much About Ink
Cartridges?, IP Watch: Inside Views (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2015/09/17/the-lexmark-litigation-why-does-big-pharma-care-so-much-about-inkcartridges [http://perma.cc/X4K7-GLAE] (“PhRMA claims that, if patent rights were
exhausted by sales abroad, the ‘artiﬁcially lowered prices’ of foreign markets would
encourage the resale of medicines from those markets in the US.”).
33. See Sisule F. Musungu & Cecilia Oh, Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights,
Innovation & Pub. Health, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries:
Can They Promote Access to Medicines? 30 (Aug. 2005), http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CAR-UXT4]
(recommending developing countries adopt international exhaustion rules but not
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tion rules aﬀect access to medicines. In the South African case, the
beneﬁts to South Africa from adopting a rule of international patent
exhaustion could only materialize if patentees previously had authorized
sales in other countries at more heavily discounted prices. In other
words, South Africa’s gain from its own exhaustion rule comes at the
expense of patients elsewhere—and likely at the expense of patients in
countries where per capita income is lower than it is in South Africa. 34
We are not, however, aware of any study suggesting that the United
States’ adoption of an international exhaustion rule would lead to lower
prices in the developing world. 35 To the contrary, the consensus among
scholars of IP law and economics is that a U.S. rule of international patent
exhaustion would lead to higher prices for patented products in lowerincome countries, although there is some debate about whether the net
result would be an increase or decrease in global welfare. 36 As counterintuitive as it might be for developing countries and global access-tomedicine proponents to take the side of pharmaceutical companies, their
mentioning effect U.S. exhaustion rules would have on developing countries); Jayashree
Watal, Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries: Does the WTO TRIPS
Agreement Hinder It? 4–5 (Harvard Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Sci., Tech. & Innovation,
Discussion Paper No. 8, 2000), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/biotech/papers/
discussion8.pdf [http://perma.cc/XP2Q-N2N4] (discussing effects developing nations’
adoption of international exhaustion rule could have on their economies).
34. Indeed, this possibility is admitted by one of the studies cited by the Public
Knowledge brief. See Watal, supra note 33, at 5 (“[I]t has to be noted that consumers in
developing countries from which parallel imports originate may experience a rise in prices
or may face inadequate availability of the product subject to parallel imports.”).
35. A U.S. rule of international exhaustion might make it more likely that other
countries will adopt international exhaustion. See Kilic & Maybarduk, supra note 32
(stating U.S. rule of international exhaustion would reduce international pressure against
other countries’ adoption of similar rules). But uniform international exhaustion rules
would not beneﬁt the developing world because this regime would still lead to raised
prices in countries where patented goods are currently less expensive. And while the
Oﬃce of the U.S. Trade Representative has at times worked to “export a ban on
international patent exhaustion,” Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International
Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 977, 1021
(2014), Congress has subsequently prohibited appropriated funds from being used to
include similar text in other free-trade agreements. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 22, 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-108, § 631, 119 Stat. 2290, 2344 (2005) (stating “[n]one of the funds made
available in this Act may be used to include in any new bilateral or multilateral trade
agreement the text of” provisions in other free-trade agreements that banned international patent exhaustion).
36. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Yongmin Chen, Vertical Price Control and Parallel
Imports: Theory and Evidence, 12 Rev. Int’l Econ. 551, 561–62 (2004) (“[P]arallel
importing can increase world welfare in some situations but reduce world welfare in other
situations . . . .”); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods: International
Exhaustion for Patents, 29 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 317, 361–62 (2014) (noting conventional
argument that “international exhaustion would result in less innovation and less access for
consumers in low-income countries,” but arguing this “fails to recognize the costs of
geographical price discrimination”). For an explanation of how a U.S. rule of
international exhaustion might increase global welfare in a world with price controls, see
supra note 29.
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interests in fact seem aligned on the exhaustion issue. 37 In sum, while the
net winners and losers from a U.S. international exhaustion rule are
somewhat ambiguous, it seems clear that consumers in low-income
countries do not come out ahead.
III. PRESERVING INNOVATION POLICY POSSIBILITIES
If the Supreme Court adopts an international exhaustion rule in
Lexmark or another case, the decision would, as explained above, almost
certainly result in higher prices for patented products in non-U.S.
markets. But a U.S. rule of international patent exhaustion would also
have a further eﬀect abroad: It would make it more diﬃcult for foreign
countries to allocate access to patentable goods via nonmarket mechanisms. Some national governments subsidize their citizens’ consumption
of patented products: Examples range from the U.K. National Health
Service’s provision of pharmaceuticals 38 to Uruguay’s one-laptop-perchild program. 39 If the subsidy reduces the price for the consumer to
marginal cost, then the subsidy can eliminate the deadweight loss from
the patent monopoly (though the use of the tax system to ﬁnance the
subsidy may yield deadweight losses of its own 40). But if arbitrageurs can
acquire the patented product in the foreign country and export it to the

37. We are not the ﬁrst to make this observation. See, e.g., Nick Gallus, The Mystery
of Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade and Developing Countries, 7 J. World Intell. Prop. 169,
171–81 (2002) (explaining why developing countries are wrong to support legality of
parallel trade). And the observation should be coupled with a caveat: If a rule of international patent exhaustion bolsters the bargaining power of patentees in negotiations with
developing countries, see Grossman & Lai, supra note 29, at 4 n.2 (“The possibility of
reimportation strengthens the bargaining position of the manufacturer by lending credibility to the threat that he will not serve the foreign market.”), then patentees might be
better oﬀ under exhaustion than under the current regime. In that case, advocates for
access to patentable goods in the developing world and pharmaceutical companies both
would be on the “wrong” side of the exhaustion issue (i.e., both would be taking positions
against their own interests). Advocates for access to patentable goods should cross over to
the anti-exhaustion camp, while pharmaceutical companies and other patent holders should
cross over to the pro-exhaustion side.
38. See U.K. Dep’t of Health, The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 2014 (Dec.
2013), http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/
282523/Pharmaceutical_Price_Regulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6Y6-FHGW] (setting out
rules whereby U.K. Department of Health purchases patented medicines from pharmaceutical manufacturers that opt into Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme for distribution within United Kingdom through its National Health Service).
39. See Verónica Psetizki, Laptop for Every Pupil in Uruguay, BBC News (Oct. 16, 2009,
8:25 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8309583.stm [http://perma.cc/5TLXKSR5] (describing how Uruguay provides a free laptop for every child attending state
primary school).
40. Or it may not. See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the
Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 Nat’l Tax J. 513, 513 (1996) (showing under certain
conditions, provision of public goods can be ﬁnanced through income taxes in way that
leads to no additional distortion).
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United States, then the foreign country ends up subsidizing consumption
by U.S. consumers—which may lead it to withdraw the subsidy altogether.
A concrete example helps to illustrate this scenario. A firm charges
$100 in the United States for a patented laptop, while Uruguay offers its
citizens a $90 subsidy that reduces the price of the laptop from $100 to
$10. If the United States adopts a rule of international patent exhaustion,
then arbitrageurs stand to profit by procuring laptops for $10 in Uruguay
and reselling them in the United States for less than $100. 41 If arbitrageurs
compete with one another, then the price of a patented laptop in the
United States will fall below $100, which means that some portion of
Uruguay’s $90-per-laptop subsidy will redound to the benefit of U.S.
citizens. (Indeed, with perfect competition among arbitrageurs and no
transportation costs, the price of a patented laptop in the United States
will fall all the way to $10, and Uruguay’s $90-per-laptop subsidy will be
captured almost entirely by non-Uruguayans.) Uruguay might respond to
this problem by attaching conditions to its own subsidies (e.g., a rule that
recipients of the $90 subsidy must promise not to resell the laptops
outside Uruguay). But those restrictions may be diﬃcult to enforce, and
in any event, the cost of enforcement is nonzero. Thus, a U.S. rule of
international patent exhaustion would make it more costly for a country
like Uruguay to adopt a subsidy program for patented products, thereby
limiting Uruguay’s autonomy to craft its own policy for allocating access
to patentable goods. 42
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE TRADEOFFS

AND

PARALLEL TRADE

If U.S. courts agree that adopting an international patent exhaustion
rule would harm foreign consumers and make it more diﬃcult for
foreign countries to choose nonmarket mechanisms for allocating access
to patentable goods, should this factor into their analysis of the exhaustion issue? The economic analysis of IP often takes eﬃciency as its
lodestar and leaves the tough distributive justice questions for tax law. 43
This approach maps messily onto the question of international patent
41. In fact, the laptops distributed in Uruguay, which had a nominal value of $188, were
offered to Americans in a limited program for about $425 and were being resold for as much
as $600 on eBay. San Jose Mercury News, Low-Cost XO Laptops Are Fetching Good Prices on
eBay Auctions, Balt. Sun ( Jan. 3, 2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-0103/business/0801030345_1_xo-ebay-laptop [http://perma.cc/YQ5F-CGF9].
42. In a forthcoming article, we explain that such autonomy—in production of
patentable goods in addition to allocation—is a principal advantage of the existing
international IP regime. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods
and Nation-States, 101 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 50),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2745632. The Federal Circuit’s adoption of an international
exhaustion rule would severely undermine this advantage.
43. Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Eﬃcient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 667–68 (1994)
(“[R]edistribution through legal rules oﬀers no advantage over redistribution through the
income tax system and typically is less eﬃcient.”).
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exhaustion—most obviously because there is no global tax system to
redistribute wealth. But even more fundamentally, one cannot identify
the policy that maximizes aggregate welfare without ﬁrst deciding whose
welfare counts in the calculus. If one assigns zero value to the interests of
foreigners, then the United States might well be better oﬀ if it adopted a
rule of international patent exhaustion. If one assigns a very high value to
the interests outside the United States, particularly those in developing
countries, then one should almost certainly come down against a U.S. rule
of international exhaustion. The harder question is how much weight U.S.
courts and policymakers should assign to foreign interests—a question that
no economic model can resolve.
One might argue that U.S. policymakers should pursue IP rules that
maximize global rather than national welfare because the United States
already redistributes wealth to the global South each year via foreign
aid. 44 The United States should therefore adopt the IP policies that
maximize global welfare, and if those rules also lead to more redistribution to the global South than U.S. voters think is optimal, then the
United States can cut its foreign aid expenditures commensurately. On
this view, the shift to an IP rule that maximizes global welfare is Pareto
eﬃcient (i.e., it leaves everyone at least as well oﬀ as before): Adjustments to foreign aid allow the United States to engage in the same
amount of redistribution as previously while also growing the global pie.
There are, however, several caveats that come with this argument. First,
the argument treats the “global South” as an undiﬀerentiated block
when in fact it comprises more than 100 distinct nation-states. 45 To fully
oﬀset the distributive consequences of a change to its IP laws, the United
States would have to calculate each country’s losses or gains from the
change—and any such calculations would almost certainly be imprecise.
Moreover, there are some countries (e.g., Eritrea) that categorically
refuse U.S. aid; for those countries, the United States cannot oﬀset the
distributive consequences of IP policy changes via foreign aid
adjustments. 46 Second, the argument glosses over the institutional
44. See ForeignAssistance.gov, http://foreignassistance.gov (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (reporting U.S. government plans to spend $37.9
billion in foreign aid for ﬁscal year 2016).
45. See Paulos Milkias, Developing the Global South: A United Nations Prescription for
the Third Millennium 45 (2010) (stating “global South” generally includes Asia (but not
Japan), Africa, and Latin America—areas encompassing well over 100 nations—but also
noting that, like “Third World,” this is a less descriptive euphemism for “poor nations”); see
also Country & Lending Groups, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/about/countryand-lending-groups [http://perma.cc/433C-X8RH] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (reporting 135
countries have GNI per capita under $12,736).
46. See Edmund Sanders, Eritrea Aspires to Be Self-Reliant, Rejecting Foreign Aid,
L.A. Times (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-eritrea2oct02-story.html
[http://perma.cc/K8DQ-GMRF] (describing Eritrea’s decade-long self-reliance program,
which included rejecting hundreds of millions in foreign aid). Note, though, that most
countries do receive U.S. aid in some form, even under the no-exhaustion status quo. See
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dimension of U.S. patent policymaking: The institution that will decide
the Lexmark case (U.S. courts) is not the institution that sets the foreign
aid budget (Congress). Even if Congress conceivably could adjust foreign
aid spending to oﬀset the redistributive consequences in the event that
the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit in the Lexmark case,
political gridlock may stand in the way of such adjustments. 47 So as a
practical matter, if the Supreme Court adopts an international
exhaustion rule, the decision will have distributive eﬀects that Congress is
unlikely to oﬀset.
Alternatively, one might argue that U.S. federal courts—when faced
with a tradeoﬀ between the interests of U.S. citizens and those of lowincome individuals overseas—should err on the side of favoring foreign
interests because the error costs in that direction are lower (at least
where, as here, Congress can override any court decision by statute). The
argument would be that if the federal court reaches a foreigner-favorable
result out of line with the distributive preferences of most U.S. voters,
members of Congress will have a strong incentive to override the court
through legislation. By contrast, if the court reaches a U.S.-favorable
result misaligned with majoritarian distributive preferences (i.e., if the
judicial decision leads to a larger inbound redistribution of wealth than
U.S. voters think is optimal), then Congress is unlikely to correct the
error. (After all, very few U.S. politicians win elections on a platform of
“more foreign aid.”) 48 This argument, however, has somewhat less force
in the exhaustion context, where there are well-organized interests on
both sides. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry will ﬁght ﬁercely against
any legislative eﬀort to adopt an exhaustion rule, while if the Supreme
Court reverses the Federal Circuit in Lexmark, ﬁrms such as Amazon,
Costco, Facebook, and Google will lobby hard against any bill to bring
back the no-exhaustion regime. The likelihood of a lobbying stalemate
may mean that Congress will leave in place whatever patent exhaustion
rules the courts choose.

U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Foreign Aid Dashboard, http://explorer.usaid.gov/aiddashboard.html [http://perma.cc/ZFB6-A9YC] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (showing United
States gave $40 billion in aid to 194 countries in 2013). This suggests that even after
redistributing wealth via its no-exhaustion rule, the United States still desires to transfer
more wealth to most other countries.
47. See generally Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deﬁcit
in Law and Economics, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1051 (2016) (noting eﬃciency-improving
judicial decisions may have redistributive consequences that political process is unlikely to
oﬀset).
48. For an analogous argument that courts should err against politically powerful
interest groups when interpreting ambiguous statutes, see Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model,
86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 223–24 (1986) (“Too often the [political] process seems to serve
only the purely private interests of special interest groups at the expense of the broader
public interests it was ostensibly designed to serve.”).
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C ONCLUSION
In short, the normative question at the heart of Lexmark—how much
U.S. courts should care about foreign consumers—is a question that
deﬁes easy answer. While we do not seek to answer it here, 49 we do oﬀer
two observations. First, advocates for access to patented goods in the
developing world seem to be on the “wrong” side of the exhaustion
debate, in the sense that the rule they are advocating will yield consequences inconsistent with their stated objectives. Second, there is no
“right” answer to the exhaustion question independent of one’s distributional preferences—and, in particular, one’s cross-national distributional preferences. Those who argue that a U.S. rule of international
patent exhaustion can be a win-win for consumers at home and abroad
are, this piece argues, avoiding the inevitable tradeoﬀs that Lexmark
forces us to face.

49. Philosophers have for decades debated the question of how much individuals in
the industrialized world should value the interests of those in lower-income countries.
Arguably the most signiﬁcant work on the subject (and quite likely the most thoughtprovoking) is Peter Singer, Famine, Aﬄuence, and Morality, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aﬀ. 229 (1972).

